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Abstract: We will consider a mixed Bertrand duopoly model
(that means, two firms decide simultaneously their prices for
a substitutable good) to study the relationship between the
privatization of a state-owned public firm and government
preferences for tax revenue. In the model, we assume that
the government imposes a specific tax rate on the quantity
produced by each firm. Furthermore, the public firm aims to
maximize social welfare, whereas the governmentâ ˘A ´Zs ob-
jective function is a weighted sum between social welfare
and tax revenue. Of course, the private firm aims to maxi-
mize its own profit. We also present comparative static re-
sults.
keywords: Modeling, Optimization, Industrial Organiza-
tion, Game Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Competition between public and private firms exists in a
range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, nat-
ural gas, airlines industries, and services including hospi-
tals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed
oligopolies under quantity competition and some others con-
sidered price competition. Ogawa and Kato [5] consider a
Bertrand model in which firms produce homogenous goods
and have quadratic cost functions. They compare the prices
set by firms when prices are set simultaneously and sequen-
tially. White [6] and Fjell and Heywood [2] introduced a
subsidy into the mixed model. In these studies, the objective
function of both the government and the public firm is the
social welfare. Matsumura [4] considered an objective func-
tion that is a weighted average of a modified social welfare
and the profit of the firm. The modified social welfare allows
the government to prefer consumer surplus to the profits of
the two firms.
Kato [3] uses a mixed Cournot model to study the rela-
tionship between privatization and government preferences
for tax revenue. He assumes that the government prefers tax
revenue to the social welfare, whereas the public firm only
cares about the social welfare. Ferreira and Ferreira [1] did
a similar analysis in a Stackelberg duopoly model with the
public firm as the leader.
In this paper, we also study the relationship between
privatization and government preferences for tax revenue,
but by considering a Bertrand model, instead of a Cournot
model. Furthemore, we consider that firms produce differen-
tiated goods, instead of homogenous goods. We get that if
the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax rev-
enue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize
the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a mod-
erately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both
surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.
2. THE MIXED DUOPOLY
We consider a mixed duopoly with firms F1 and F2 being,
respectively, the public and the private firms. Both firms pro-
duce substitutable goods. The demand functions are given
by
qi =
a(1− b)− pi + bpj
1− b2 , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2,
where pi is the market price of the good produced by firm Fi,
qi is the quantity produced by firm Fi, b ∈ (0, 1) measures
the degree to which goods are substitutes and a > 0. For
simplicity, we assume a = 1 and b = 0.5. So,
qi =
2
3
(1− 2pi + pj), i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2.
The decision variables of the firms are the prices for the
goods they produce, and they choose their values simulta-
neously. So, both firms act as Bertrand players in the market.
The marginal cost of production of both firms is c, that, with-
out loss of generality, we assume equal to zero. Furthermore,
we assume that the government imposes a specific tax rate on
both firms. So, the profit function pii of firm Fi is given by
pii = (pi − t)qi, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2,
where t is the specific tax rate.
Social welfare W , which is the sum of consumer surplus
(CS) and producer surplus, is given by
W = CS + pi1 + pi2,
where
CS =
2
3
(p2
1
− p1p2 + p22 + 1− p1 − p2).
The public firm F1 aims to maximize the social welfare
W , and the private firm F2 aims to maximize its profit pi2.
The government’s payoff is given by
U = W + (1 + α)T,
where T = t(q1+q2) is the tax revenue, and α is the parame-
ter representing the weight of the government preference for
the tax revenue. Since we are interested in the case where the
government puts a larger weight on T than on W , we con-
sider α ≥ 0. Furthermore, we are also interested just in inner
solutions; so, we restrict the values of α to α > 1/22.
The model is a two-stage game. In the first stage, the
government chooses the specific tax rate t. In the second
stage, both firms decide the prices p1 and p2, simultaneously.
To obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium, the game is solved
by backwards induction.
In the mixed Bertrand duopoly model presented above,
we get the following results 1.
Proposition 1. In the Bertrand mixed duopoly, as described
above, the tax rate and prices, at equilibrium, are given by
tM =
77α− 15
2(77α+ 31)
,
pM
1
=
2(22α− 1)
77α+ 31
,
1Throughout the paper, we use the notation superscript M to refer to the
mixed competition.
pM
2
=
99α+ 7
77α+ 31
.
We observe that for α > 15/77, the optimal tax rate is
positive; for 1/22 < α < 15/77, the optimal tax rate is neg-
ative. From the expressions above, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 2. At equilibrium, the aggregate quantity, the
social welfare and the government’s payoff function are
given by
QM =
121(α+ 1)
3(77α+ 31)
,
WM =
2783(α+ 1)2
3(77α+ 31)2
,
UM =
121(α+ 1)2
6(77α+ 31)
.
3. THE PRIVATIZED DUOPOLY
Now, suppose that the public firm is privatized. So, both
firms aim to maximize their own profits.
In the privatized Bertrand duopoly model presented
above, we get the following results 2.
Proposition 3. In the Bertrand privatized duopoly, as de-
scribed above, the tax rate and prices, at equilibrium, are
given by
tP =
3α− 1
2(3α+ 1)
,
pP
1
= pP
2
=
2α
3α+ 1
.
We observe that for α > 1/3, the optimal tax rate is pos-
itive; for 1/22 < α < 1/3, the optimal tax rate is negative.
From the expressions above, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4. At equilibrium, the aggregate quantity, the
social welfare and the government’s payoff function are
given by
QP =
4(α+ 1)
3(3α+ 1)
,
WP =
4(α+ 1)2
3(3α+ 1)2
,
UP =
2(α+ 1)2
3(3α+ 1)
.
2Throughout the paper, we use the notation superscript P to refer to the
privatized competition.
4. EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION
In this section, we compare the mixed and privatized
duopoly equilibria.
tM − tP = 8(α+ 1)
(3α+ 1)(77α+ 31)
,
QM −QP = (α+ 1)(55α− 3)
3(3α+ 1)(77α+ 31)
,
WM −WP = (α+ 1)
2(1331α2 − 2398α− 1061)
3(3α+ 1)2(77α+ 31)2
,
UM − UP = (α+ 1)
2(55α− 3)
6(3α+ 1)(77α+ 31)
.
These results lead to the following. Privatization will de-
crease the optimal tax rate imposed by the government. If
1/22 < α < 3/55, privatization will increase the aggre-
gate quantity in the market; and if α > 3/55, privatiza-
tion will decrease the aggregate quantity in the market. If
1/22 < α < (109+32
√
23)/121, privatization will increase
the social welfare; and if α > (109 + 32
√
23)/121, privati-
zation will decrease the social welfare. If 1/22 < α < 3/55,
privatization will increase the government’s payoff; and if
α > 3/55, privatization will decrease the government’s pay-
off.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analysed the relationship between the
privatization of a public firm and government preferences for
tax revenue in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly model. We
concluded that if the government puts a sufficiently larger
weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it
will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the govern-
ment puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on
the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank ESEIG and Polytechnic Institute of Porto for
their financial support.
References
[1] F.A. Ferreira, and F. Ferreira, “Privatization and gov-
ernment preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackel-
berg versus Cournot,” In Tenreiro Machado et al.
(Eds.) Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear
Physical Systems. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1-
24, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, pp.
421-430, 2014.
[2] K. Fjell, and J. Heywood, “Mixed oligopoly, subsi-
dization and the order of firms’s moves: the relevance
of privatization,” Economics Letters, Vol. 53, pp. 411-
416, 2004.
[3] H. Kato, “Privatization and government preference,”
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 40, pp. 1-7, 2008.
[4] T. Matsumura, “Partial privatization in mixed
Duopoly,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 70, No.
40, pp. 473-483, 1998.
[5] A. Ogawa, and K. Kato, “Price competition in a mixed
duopoly,” Economics Letters, Vol. 12, pp. 4-15, 2006.
[6] M. White, “Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsi-
dization,” Economics Letters, Vol. 53, pp. 189-195,
1996.
